State v. Cabrera Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41510 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-11-2014
State v. Cabrera Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
41510
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Cabrera Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41510" (2014). Not Reported. 1658.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1658
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






ALFREDO CABRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ___________ ) 
NO. 41510 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
NO. CR 2013~1284 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720s0010 
(208) 334-4534 
r-···· .. ··~::-i lo~ 
S.,.CGirL-('.(utalffl).__ 
Eni!Nd on .(fS ill' 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 2 
ARGU~J1ENT .......................................................................................................... 3 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Cabrera's Motion To Suppress 
The Evidence Found During The Search Incident To Arrest Since The 
Arrest Was Unlawful ........................................................................................ 3 
A. The Case Law Upon Which The State Relies Is Not Relevant 
To This Factual Scenario ............................................................................ 3 
B. The Facts Upon Which The State Relies To Try And 
Distinguish Brandstetter Are Not Relevant To The 
Proper Analysis Of This Issue .................................................................... 6 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322 (1966) ..................................................... 6 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ................................................................ 7 
State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................................... .4 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) .............................................................. 7, 9 
State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1995) ................................. passim 
State v. George, 127 Idaho 693 (1995) ................................................................. 5 
State v. Quimby, 122 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 1992) .................................................. 3 
State v. Wright, 117 Idaho 604 (Ct. App. 1990) ............................................... .4, 5 
Statutes 
I.C. § 18-705 ..................................................................................................... 3, 9 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Alfredo Cabrera appeals, contending that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. He asserts that his arrest for obstruction was unjustified, and thus, 
the warrantless search of his person incident to that arrest was unreasonable, because 
the statement upon which the arrest was based did not constitute obstruction under the 
relevant statute. As such, he contends that the district court erred by not suppressing 
the fruits of that unreasonable, warrantless search. 
The State responds, contending that there was probable cause to justify the 
arrest for obstruction, and thus, the search was reasonable. The State's argument is 
rnistaken. This reply is necessary to address the State's reliance on case law that is not 
relevant to the factual scenario presented in this case and factual contentions that are 
not relevant to the proper analysis of the issue on appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Cabrera's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Cabrera's motion to suppress the 
evidence found during the search incident to arrest since the arrest was unlawful. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Cabrera's Motion To Suppress The Evidence 
Found Durin The Search Incident To Arrest Since The Arrest Was Unlawful 
Mr. Cabrera contends that, under the rule set forth in State v. Brandstetter, 127 
Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1995), his responses to Officer DeBie's questions, wherein he 
denied knowledge of the person who Officer DeBie was trying to find (Mr. Gordobea), 
were not sufficient to create probable cause to arrest him for obstruction. Therefore, he 
contends that the subsequent search incident to that arrest was unreasonable and the 
evidence found during that search should have been suppressed. The State responds, 
asserting that Mr. Cabrera's statements did obstruct Officer DeBie's investigation, and 
therefore, the arrest was lawful. The State's contentions are mistaken. The case law 
upon which it relies is not relevant to the factual scenario at hand, and the facts it cites 
in support of its position are not relevant to the proper analysis of this issue. 
A The Case Law Upon Which The State Relies Is Not Relevant To This Factual 
Scenario 
It is important to recognize that a person might obstruct an officer in two distinct 
ways - by making a false statement or by physically impeding or resisting the officer. 
See I.C. § 18-705. As the factual scenarios under each theory of obstruction are 
distinct, so, too, are the applicable legal rules. Compare Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 
886-88 (considering obstruction by making a statement), with State v. Quimby, 122 
Idaho 389, 391 (Ct. App. 1992) (considering obstruction by physically impeding an 
officer). The cases upon which the State relies dealt with situations where the 
defendants physically prevented the officers from fulfilling their duties or resisted lawful 
commands after being seized. As such, the analyses in those cases are not relevant to 
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the situation where the defendant, like Mr. Cabrera, only makes a statement to the 
officers. 
For example, in Quimby, the defendant was interfering with the officers' ability to 
effect an arrest on his brother following a bar fight by continuously "plac[ing] himself in 
the path of the officers, forcing them to push him out of their way. Quimby ignored the 
officers' repeated verbal requests to move away. He placed himself unnecessarily 
close to the officers and made hand gestures in front of their faces." Id. at 39·1. 
Mr. Cabrera engaged in no such actions. He was not physically interfering with Officer 
DeBie, such that the officer could not fulfill his duties because of Mr. Cabrera was in his 
way. Rather, Mr. Cabrera's only acts were to make verbal statements in response to 
the officer's questions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.9 - p:10, L.8.) Therefore, the analysis in 
Quimby is inapplicable to the case at hand. 
Two of the other decisions the State cites in supprni of its position are similarly 
inapplicable. In State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 361-63 (Ct. App. 2003), there was 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of obstruction because he ran and hid from 
the officer while the officer was trying to arrest him. In State v. Wright, 117 Idaho 604, 
607 (Ct. App. 1990), there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction 
because he refused to obey the officer's lawful commands during a traffic stop of the car 
in which he was riding and physically resisted the officer's attempt to perform his 
duties in that situation. Specifically, in Wright, the officer was trying to arrest the other 
occupant of the car, and the defendant was shouting at officers, keeping his left hand 
near a suspicious bulge in one of his pockets, despite the officer's instructions to not do 
so. Id. He also pushed the officer while the officer attempted to perform a pat search of 
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the defendant. Id. Since Mr. Cabrera engaged in no such actions, the analyses in 
Anderson and Wright are not relevant to this case. 
Wright is further inapplicable because, in that case, the officer had seized the 
defendant and was giving lawful commands which the defendant was not free to ignore. 
See Wright, 117 Idaho at 607. That is also true of the final case the State relies upon. 
See State v. George, 127 Idaho 693 (1995). In George, the defendant was seized 
during a traffic stop and refused to comply with the officer's lawful instruction to provide 
identification, proof of registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at 699. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court pointed out, the defendant in that case did not have the option of 
ignoring the officer's instructions at that time. Id. Unlike the defendants in George and 
Wright, Mr. Cabrera was free to ignore Officer DeBie's questions because the encounter 
where Mr. Cabrera made the statements at issue was a consensual encounter, not a 
seizure. 1 (See App. Br., p.8.) Since Mr. Cabrera was not obligated to respond to 
Officer DeBie's questions, the analyses in George and Wright are inapplicable to this 
case. 
Instead, the applicable precedent for this case is Brandstetter. In that case, 
the Court of Appeals directly addressed an obstruction charge where the defendant's 
only action was verbally denying knowledge in response to officers' questions.2 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 886. Furthermore, the defendant in that case was not in a 
1 The State does not contest this conclusion. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
2 The defendant in Brandstetter apparently made other actions with respect to the item 
for which the officers were searching that might have impacted the obstruction analysis, 
as the item was ultimately found in the alley behind the defendant's office. Brandstetter, 
127 Idaho at 886. However, the only actions the Court of Appeals discussed in 
reaching its decision were the defendant's statements to the officers. See id. at 886-88. 
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position where he was required to respond to the officers' questions. Id. at 888. In such 
a situation, a response to an officer's question which denies knowledge of the subject of 
the question is not sufficient to justify the charge of obstruction.3 Id. at 887-88. Since 
all Mr. Cabrera did was deny knowledge in response to Officer DeBie's questions when 
he could have stood silent, applying the appropriate legal rules, there was no probable 
cause to justify arresting Mr. Cabrera for obstruction. 
B. The Facts Upon Which The State Relies To Try And Distinguish Brandstetter Are 
Not Relevant To The Proper Analysis Of This Issue 
The State attempts to distinguisr1 Brandstetter based on the idea that 
Mr. Cabrera did more than just respond that he did not know Mr. Gordobea. The State 
contends that Mr. Cabrera "expressly misdirected the officer away from the individual he 
was looking for and suggested he go look for [Mr.] Gordobea in apartments located on 
the dairy." (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) That assertion mischaracterizes the evidence in this 
regard. Officer DeBie actually testified: "Mr. Cabrera said that he believes that he 
[Mr. Gordobea] lives in the apartments on the dairy." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.4-6.) Telling 
Officer DeBie, that he, Mr. Cabrera, believed that Mr. Gordobea lived in the dairy 
apartments is not the same as telling the officer that he would find Mr. Gordobea if he 
looked in those apartments. The latter constitutes an affirmative representation as to 
Mr. Gordobea's current location, whereas the former contains no such indication of 
3 Brandstetter was decided after George, Quimby, and Wright. Since the courts are 
presumed to know the law when they make decisions in a case, City of 
Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322, 327-28 (1966), the fact that Brandstetter employed a 
different analysis in regard to that particular factual scenario, rather than applying the 
analyses from those other cases, further demonstrates that the analyses in those cases 
is not applicable to the particular factual scenario presented in Brandstetter, and again 
in Mr. Cabrera's case. 
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where Mr. Gordobea's is currently located.4 Therefore, the State's characterization of 
Mr. Cabrera's statements as a "suggest[ion that] he go look for [Mr.] Gordobea in 
apartments located on the dairy" misrepresents the facts of this case, and should be 
rejected as such. 
Furthermore, the State's reliance on Mr. Cabrera's statement about the dairy 
apartments is not relevant to the determination of whether there was probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Cabrera for obstruction because it was not a false statement. As Idaho's 
appellate courts have indicated, the critical question in an obstruction-by-statement 
case is whether the defendant knowingly gives a false report to the officer. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888; see State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 813 (2009) (noting 
that a person giving a report to officers subjects himself to criminal sanctions if that 
report is knowingly false). As Mr. Gordobea did, in fact, iive in the dairy apartments 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.18-25), Mr. Cabrera's statement to Officer DeBie - that "he believes 
that [Mr. Gordobea] lives in the apartments on the dairy" - was not a false statement. 
4 Grafting the implied assertion of location onto Mr. Cabrera's statement is also 
inappropriate because whether that response implied anything beyond the bare fact that 
Mr. Gordobea might live in the dairy apartments depends on the question to which 
Mr. Cabrera was responding. For example, that implication might be present if Officer 
DeBie had asked, "Do you know where Mr. Gordobea is?" However, that implication 
would not be present if Officer DeBie had asked, "Do you know where Mr. Gordobea 
lives?" The problem is that the State did not clarify on that point at the evidentiary 
hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.9 - p.10, L.8.) The State bears the burden of 
proving that the arrest, and thus, the subsequent search, was reasonable. See, e.g., 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1978). Therefore, the absence of any 
evidence in this record as to what question Mr. Cabrera was answering demonstrates 
that the State failed to meet its burden. It also means that the State cannot properly 
argue about any potential implied assertions in Mr. Cabrera's statement is not properly 
made on appeal, as that argument is not supported by the facts in the record. 
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Therefore, tt1at statement does not provide any support to the State's contention that 
there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Cabrera for obstruction. 
Furthermore, the State's argument does not address the heart of the proper 
analysis: whether the officer's investigation would have been less burdened had the 
defendant stood silent. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 887-88. That is not the case here. 
Had Mr. Cabrern stood silent, Officer DeBie's investigation would still have taken the 
same track as it actually did - he would have continued to look around the dairy (which 
includes the dairy apartments) for Mr. Gordobea, seeking to locate another dairy 
employee who could identify Mr. Gordobea, and, upon uncovering more information, the 
officer would have returned to the milk barn to try to confront Mr. Gordobea. Therefore, 
Mr. Cabrera's statements did not increase the burden on Officer DeBie. 
Additionally, the fact that Officer DeBie chose to go to the apartments rather than 
immediately seek out the diary foreperson does not mean that Mr. Cabrera's statements 
increased his burden. Officer DeBie would have had to make that same choice even if 
Mr. Cabrera had stood silent because Mr. Gordobea also told Officer DeBie about the 
apartments. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.6-8.) Because Mr. Cabrera's statements did not 
increase the burden on Officer DeBie any more than his silence would have, Officer 
DeBie did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Cabrera for obstruction. 
Finally, the State does not respond to the point that Brandstetter suggests that 
the prohibition against obstructing an officer by making verbal statements, as provided 
in I.C. § 18-705, only applies to statements the defendant volunteers, not to statements 
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he makes in response to an officer's questions.5 Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888; see 
also Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813 (noting that a citizen making a report to officers 
"subject[s] himself" to criminal sanctions if that report is knowingly false). Mr. Cabrera's 
statements were made in response to Officer DeBie's questions: "/ [Officer DeBie] 
asked them if they knew [Mr. Gordobea] .... At first they both stated that they did not. 
And then after a little bit more questioning, they said that they believed that he lived in 
the apartments on the dairy." (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.2 (emphasis added).) 
Because Mr. Cabrera made those statements in response to Officer DeBie's questions, 
they do not give rise to probable cause for obstructing under I.C. § 18-705. 
As a result, the arrest for obstructing was unlawful, and so, the search incident to 
that arrest was unreasonable. Therefore, the district court erred by not suppressing the 
evidence found as a result of the search incident to that unlawful arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cabrera respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2014. 
4 /J .... / 
// // /;.-
5 • // // 
·-/ l,1/ 
BR AN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
5 As noted in the Appellant's Brief, other states have expressly held that the obstruction 
laws only apply to volunteered false reports to the officer, not statements in response to 
an officer's questions, based, in part, on the language in the Brandstetter opinion. 
(App. Br., pp.11-12.) 
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